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The District Court's Order Reducing The Felony Charges To Misdemeanors Is 
An Appealable Order 
A. Introduction 
The state filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's order 
"granting the defendant's motion to dismiss or reform the information." (R., pp. 
184, 198.) Hughes contends the court's order was not appealable, and therefore 
appellate jurisdiction was not perfected. (Respondent's brief, pp. 16-23.) This 
argument fails because an Order of the Idaho Supreme Court resolved this issue 
and also because Hughes' argument is without merit because the district court's 
order reducing two felony charges to misdemeanors is appealable as a matter of 
right. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when 
brought to [the appellate court's] attention and should be addressed prior to 
considering the merits of an appeal." State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 
57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free 
review. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. 
The same standards of construction are used with court rules as with 
statutes, and thus rules of procedure must be interpreted according to their plain 
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language. Joyner v. State, 156 Idaho 223, _, 322 P.3d 305, 311 (Ct. App. 
2014). 
C. The Order Of The Idaho Supreme Court Denying The Motion To Dismiss 
Controls This Issue 
On May 5, 2014, Hughes filed a "Motion to Dismiss Appeal" (hereinafter 
"Motion") and "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal" 
(hereinafter "Memorandum"). On May 8, 2014, the state filed a response to the 
Motion and on June 4, 2014, the Idaho Supreme Court, being "fully advised" and 
for "good cause appearing," denied the Motion. ("Order Denying Motion to 
Dismiss" (hereinafter "Order").) With only a few inconsequential changes, 1 
Hughes makes the same argument in his brief as he made in support of his 
Motion. (Compare Memorandum with Respondent's brief, pp. 16-23.) Because 
Hughes' argument has already been rejected on the merits, and is resubmitted 
without change, this claim should not be reconsidered. 2 
D. This Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear This Appeal 
"Any order, however denominated, reducing a charge of criminal conduct 
over the objection of the prosecutor" is appealable as a matter of right. I.C.R. 
11 (C)(5). Review of the record shows that the district court's order is appealable 
1 A quick review indicates that the last sentence of the first paragraph in the 
Memorandum was moved to be the first sentence of that paragraph in the brief 
and the phrase "at that time" was added to the citation of I.A.R. 11 (c)(3) on page 
17 of the brief. 
2 If this case is assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, review of the Order is not 
allowed. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 620, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(review of decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court is "beyond the purview" of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals). 
2 
as a matter of right under the plain language of the applicable rule. Although 
denominated an order dismissing the felony charges, because the district court's 
order was specifically without prejudice to re-filing the charges as misdemeanors, 
the legal effect of the order was to reduce the felony charges to misdemeanors. 
The district court concluded that "Counts I and II as alleged by the State 
cannot constitute a felony under the factual circumstances presented in this 
case." (R., p. 192.) The court's order ultimately states: 
Count I and Count II, as specifically alleged by the State in 
the Information filed in this case on February 5, 2013, do not 
constitute felonies as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss or Reform the Information is GRANTED. Counts 
I and 11 are dismissed without prejudice. The State may file a 
Second Amended Complaint alleging misdemeanor violations for 
Counts I and 11, within ten days of the filing of this Memorandum 
decision and Order. 
(R., p. 193.3) The obvious legal significance of this order dismissing the felonies 
without prejudice to their being re-filed as misdemeanors is that the state's 
charges were reduced over the prosecutor's objection. 
In addition, the district court in its analysis repeatedly stated that it was 
only the element that elevated the charges from a misdemeanor to a felony (the 
damage assessment of a trophy animal) that it was reviewing and finding 
inadequate. (R., pp. 187 (noting that Hughes was challenging the felony element 
of a "Flagrant Violation"); 187-88 (addressing I.C. § 36-1401(c), which 
distinguishes felonies from misdemeanors); 191 (stating that the "basis for the 
3 Because the district court, having dismissed all the felony counts, contemplated 
that the remaining misdemeanors would be pursued by complaint instead of by 
information, this appeal also falls under I.AR. 11 (c)(3) allowing appeal from an 
"order granting a motion to dismiss an information." 
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Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" was whether the "violation was a felony 
violation"); 192 (determining that "Counts I and II as alleged by the State cannot 
constitute a felony [sic] under the factual circumstances presented in this case" 
and Hughes "cannot be convicted of a felony"); 193 (concluding that Counts I 
and II "do not constitute felonies as a matter of law" but could be filed as 
misdemeanors).) The dis.trict court's order dismissing the felonies for want of the 
element distinguishing felonies from misdemeanors, but without prejudice to re-
file the charges as misdemeanors, clearly has the legal effect of reducing the 
charges. 
Hughes' argument that the district court did not reduce the felony charges 
is at best hyper-technical and at worst disingenuous. He contends, citing State 
v. Molinelli, 105 Idaho 833, 673 P.2d 433 (1983), that for a charge to be reduced, 
the defendant must still "face[] punishment under the charges following the 
district court's order." (Respondent's brief, p. 18.) How he derived this rule from 
Molinelli is a mystery. In that case the Court held that an appeal from an order 
reducing a charge was neither a post-judgment order affecting the rights of the 
parties nor an order dismissing the information. lfL at 834-35, 673 P.2d at 434-
35. An order reducing a charge was not, under the appellate rules as they 
existed at that time, an order appealable as a matter of right. I.A.R. 11 (c) (Supp. 
1983). There is nothing in Molinelli that supports Hughes' proposed "must face 
punishment" requirement for the rule. 
Hughes' contention, ultimately, is a claim that the state had to file a 
Second Amended Criminal Complaint, as set forth in the district court's order, to 
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perfect its appeal by making him "face[] punishment." This claim is without legal 
or logical merit. Because the district court specifically ordered that the charges 
be pursued as misdemeanors or not at all, this appeal is from an "order, however 
denominated, reducing a charge of criminal conduct over the objection of the 
prosecutor." Hughes' claim of lack of appellate jurisdiction therefore fails. 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Reducing The Felony Charges To Misdemeanors 
A. Introduction 
The felony element of the statute is whether the mule deer Hughes killed 
out of season and wasted had a reimbursable damage assessment of over 
$1,000. I.C. § 36-1401 (c)(3). A trophy mule deer has a reimbursable damage 
assessment of $2,000. I.C. § 36-1404(a). Thus, if the state proved at trial that 
the mule deer was a trophy animal, it will have met the felony element of the 
charged crimes. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 4-5.) Hughes contends that the 
state's argument "fails to account for the second requirement for gaining access 
to the enhanced valuation section: the enhanced valuation is only applicable 
where the State can show that the animal was taken during the commission of a 
felony" and that the statute therefore requires that the state must prove "that the 
illegal taking already constituted a felony violation on its own" before the crime 
may be elevated to a felony based on the damage assessment. (Respondent's 
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brief, p. 11.4) The issue, as framed by the parties, is therefore whether the 
reimbursement damage of the animal alone elevates the charges at issue to 
felonies or whether the state must prove an independent felony before it may 
use the reimbursable damage assessment of a trophy animal to prove a felony. 
Review of the plain language of the statute shows that no separate felony must 
be proven, and that Hughes' reading renders a portion of the statutory language 
a nullity. 
B. The Plain Language Of The Statutes Shows That The Taking And 
Wasting Of A Trophy Mule Deer Are Felonies 
It is a felony to unlawfully kill or waste wildlife "which has a single ... 
reimbursable damage assessment of more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), 
as provided in section 36-1404." I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3). Idaho Code section 36-
1404, in turn, provides that a "[t]rophy mule deer" has a reimbursable damage of 
"two thousand dollars ($2,000) per animal killed, possessed or wasted." I.C. § 
36-1404(a). Thus, the statute makes it a felony to unlawfully kill or waste a 
trophy mule deer. 
The damage assessment for trophy mule deer may be assessed where 
the person is "convicted of a flagrant violation, in accordance with section 36-
4 Hughes also contends the state's argument "constitutes a petitio pnnc1p11 
fallacy." (Respondent's brief, p. 10.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, 
the argument Hughes claims the state is making is a straw man. The state's 
argument is that because the deer was a trophy it had a reimbursable damage 
assessment of over $1,000 and therefore its taking and wasting were felonies, 
not the convoluted argument Hughes posits. Second, the state's argument is 
that the plain language of the statute requires this analysis. The state is 
unaware of any authority by which the Court may invalidate the plain language of 
the legislature by deeming it "illogical." 
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1402(e)." I.C. § 36-1404(a). Hughes gloms onto this language and asserts that 
the state must therefore show a violation of I.C. § 36-1402(e)(6) (making "[a]ny 
felony violation provided in section 36-1401" a "flagrant violation") before it can 
show a violation of I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3). (Respondent's brief, pp. 7-13.) In turn, 
a flagrant violation consists of such practices as "spotlighting," unlawfully taking 
more than one big game animal in a year, using a cartridge during archery or 
muzzleloader season, hunting when privileges have been revoked, taking a big 
game animal during a closed season, and "[a]ny felony violation provided in 
section 36-1401, Idaho Code." I.C. § 36-1402(e). Section 36-1401, again In 
turn, contains four felony provisions: sales of poached animals or parts, release 
of certain animals into the wild without a permit, a reimbursable damage 
assessment of over $1000, and four fish and game convictions within ten years. 
I.C. § 36-1401 (c). From this Hughes concludes that to convict him under 
subsection 3, the state must prove that his crime involved sales (subsection 1 ), 
release of animals (subsection 2), or a repeated offense (subsection 4) in order 
to prove that the reimbursable damage assessment is over $1,000. (See 
Respondent's brief, pp. 11-12.) 
There are at least two flaws with this argument. The plain language of the 
statute under which Hughes is charged states that it is a felony to unlawfully kill 
or waste any wildlife with a "reimbursable damage assessment of more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000), as provided in section 36-1404, Idaho Code." I.C. § 
36-1401 (c)(3). The plain language incorporates only the amount of the 
reimbursable damage assessment found in I.C. § 36-1404, not the requirements 
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of legal liability for that assessment. For example, no reimbursable damage 
assessment may be applied unless the defendant is first convicted. I.C § 36-
1404(a) (any person who pleads guilty, is found guilty of or is convicted of the 
illegal killing or the illegal possession or illegal waste ... shall reimburse the state 
... as follows"). Nothing in the plain language of the statute requires a conviction 
of any sort, much less a felony conviction, in order to prove that the reimbursable 
damage assessment of the animal is over $1,000. The plain language of I.C. § 
36-1401(c)(3) does not incorporate the requirements for liability under I.C. § 36-
1404, only the dollar amounts. 
Second, Hughes' reading is inconsistent with the fundamental principle of 
statutory interpretation and construction requiring the Court to construe statutes 
so that effect is given to every word, clause and sentence of the statute. Athay 
v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005). Requiring the state to 
prove that the crime is a felony independent of subsection 3 in order to prove 
that it is a felony under subsection 3 effectively writes subsection 3 out of the 
statute as applied to trophy animals. 
The plain language of the applicable statutes provides that it is a felony to 
unlawfully kill or waste an animal with a reimbursable damage assessment of 
over $1,000. A trophy mule deer has a reimbursable damage assessment of 
$2,000. Therefore it is a felony to unlawfully kill or waste a trophy mule deer. 
The district court erred by concluding otherwise and should be reversed. 
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C. Legislative History Does Not Support The District Court's Holding 
Because the language of the statutes is plain, there is no call for resort to 
legislative history. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 
Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) ("legislative history and other extrinsic 
evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislature"). Hughes' argument based on legislative 
history (Respondent's brief, pp. 14-15) also fails on the merits. 
Hughes relies on a portion of the legislative history of Senate Bill 1499 
(1998). (R., pp. 98-99.) That bill amended I.C. § 36-202 by adding a definition 
of "trophy big game animal" and I.C. § 36-1404 to add an enhanced 
reimbursable damage assessment amount for killing trophy animals.5 1998 
Idaho Session Laws, ch. 175, p. 615. (See also R., pp. 86-95.) The legislative 
history cited by Hughes merely reflects the plain language of the statute: that the 
reimbursable damage assessment would only apply to "flagrant violations." 
There is nothing in either the bill itself, or the legislative history, addressing the 
statute Hughes was charged with violating (I.C. § 36-1401 (c)(3)), or when 
unlawfully killing or wasting a trophy animal would or would not be a felony. 
Even if legislative history is considered, because the legislative history Hughes 
cites does not pertain to the statute he was charged with violating, it provides no 
guidance for this Court. 
5 The bill also amended other fish and game statutes to reflect the re-numbering 
of sections 36-202 and 36-1404 caused by the amendments. It did not 
substantively amend other statutes. 
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D. The Rule Of Lenity Is Inapplicable 
"[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, 
and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute 
such that the Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature] intended." 
Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). The mere "grammatical possibility of a defendant's interpretation does 
not command a resort to the rule of lenity if the interpretation proffered by the 
defendant reflects an implausible reading of the [legislative] purpose." Abbott v. 
United States, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 18, 31 n.9 (2010) (internal quotations 
omitted). "[T]he rule of lenity applies only when grievous ambiguity or uncertainty 
in a criminal statute that is not resolved by looking at the text, context, legislative 
history, or underlying policy of the statute allows for multiple reasonable 
constructions." State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 441, 313 P.3d 765, 769 (Ct. 
App. 2013). Hughes has failed to show any ambiguity in the statute, much less 
an ambiguity rising to the level requiring application of the rule of lenity. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's order granting the 
defendant's motion to dismiss or reform the information be reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 201 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of July, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Publ~c Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. \ 
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